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Poverty and the Picture Gallery: the Whitechapel Exhibitions and 
the social project of Ruskinian aesthetics 
 
i) Introduction: defining "aesthetic experience" 
 
When critics write about "the aesthetic" today, they almost always 
invoke the notion of a separate realm removed from practical 
consequences. It is this conception of the aesthetic that has led a 
recent critic to dismiss the Whitechapel art exhibitions organized 
by Canon Samuel Augustus and Mrs Henrietta Olivia Barnett in the 
1880s and 1890s (which eventually led to the founding of the 
Whitechapel Art Gallery) as fundamentally propagandistic exercises. 
In this view, the practical purposes which the Barnetts had in mind 
when they organized the exhibitions necessarily disqualify them as 
properly aesthetic experiences.
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I do not intend to dispute the ideological nature of the 
Whitechapel exhibitions; indeed, much of this paper is devoted to 
showing the close connection between the Barnetts' ideas about art 
and their ideas about methods of poor relief. What I would like to 
question, however, is the common assumption that properly 
"aesthetic" experience is at odds with practical attempts at social 
reform. What makes the Barnetts interesting, I shall suggest, is 
precisely the continuity in their thinking between social reform 
and the aesthetic. It is this continuity which should lead us to 
complicate and relativize our notions of what constitutes properly 
"aesthetic" experience. 
 
The problem which the Barnetts pose has wider implications for our 
understanding of what "aesthetic experience" meant in the 
nineteenth century. One obvious implication is for our 
understanding of Ruskin, who greatly influenced the Barnetts. The 
difficulty of making connections between his aesthetic and social 
thought is a commonplace among Ruskin commentators, but the 
perspective outlined in this paper suggests how one might go about 
establishing the essential coherence of Ruskin's position, despite 
the shifts in emphasis that occur at various points in his career. 
 
Another implication is for how we conceptualize "aesthetic 
experience". One of my main arguments is that late nineteenth 
century debates in Britain about the nature of aesthetic experience 
derive quite directly from earlier eighteenth century British 
philosophical debates about the nature of experience itself. This 
shouldn't really surprize us, given the obvious interest of Walter 
Pater, for example, in the philosophy of David Hume.
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What this paper attempts to do, however, is to outline the other 
side of this British philosophical debate, which is far less known 
than Hume: the position of the philosopher Thomas Reid and his 
followers, collectively referred to as "the Common Sense school". I 
trace the affinity of the Ruskinian conception of what painting is 
with the fundamental claim of the Common Sense school that all 
sensory experience is a process of interpreting perceptual signs. 
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Conceiving of perception as a process of interpretation radically 
alters the notion of "aesthetic experience". Instead of 
presupposing a condition of passive sensuous receptiveness, the 
painting comes to require an active engagement of the mind, which 
is assimilated in the thought of Ruskin and the Barnetts to labour. 
The appreciation of painting can thus be seen as a preparation for 
work, and as an antidote to the mental laziness characteristics of 
"pauperism".
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The current difficulties of critics with figures such as the 
Barnetts and Ruskin can in this way be seen to stem from the 
overwhelming dominance of a Paterian/Whistlerian conception of 
"aesthetic experience". In presenting a Ruskinian aesthetic, I hope 
to suggest that we should pay more attention to the relationship 
between aesthetics and epistemology. 
 
ii) Is there a Ruskinian aesthetics? 
 
The title of my paper takes for granted that it is legitimate to 
refer to the interest in art shown by Ruskin and his followers as 
an "aesthetic" interest. But if we regard "the aesthetic" in 
Whistlerian terms, as excluding all considerations other than 
immediate sensuous impact, then the kind of interest which Ruskin 
suggests true art ought to excite cannot be characterized as 
"aesthetic".
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A more appropriate emphasis for the discussion of Ruskinian 
aesthetics would be on "disinterestedness". The sense of "the 
aesthetic" as disinterested contemplation is of course what lies 
behind Ruskin's preference for the term "theoretic" rather than 
"aesthetic" to describe the nature of legitimate interest in art; 
it is also, as we shall see, what underpins the Barnetts' interest 
in making the experience of art available to the poor.
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A recent critic, Frances Borzello, has disputed that the Barnetts 
were interested in promoting any kind of experience that could 
properly be termed "aesthetic", and has characterized the 
Whitechapel Exhibitions, mainly on the basis of the descriptions of 
paintings contained in the printed catalogue produced by the 
Barnetts and their associates, as crude exercises in propanganda 
for Victorian family values. Borzello cites an article by Henrietta 
Barnett, "The Poverty of the Poor", as evidence for her claim that 
the Barnetts regarded the poor as deficient in "family values".
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In fact, the main thrust of this article is not that the poor lack 
an appreciation of family life, but that the miserable wages paid 
to the working man make supporting a family difficult (and thus, 
presumably, mean that working-class women are forced to go out to 
work, with all the disruption of family life that entails). The 
article's sustained economic analysis makes Borzello's claim that 
"the Barnetts..believed..the key to the perfect society lay not in 
economics but in de-brutalizing the poor" a half-truth at best. 
Although they may not have believed in economic determinism, the 
Barnetts certainly believed that the economy of their day worked to 
"brutalize" the poor: in fact, as we shall see, they extended this 
economic analysis to the institutions of poor relief.
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I do not want to argue that the Barnetts' Whitechapel Exhibitions 
should not be regarded as "ideological" in nature, but neither did 
they constitute moralistic propaganda. Borzello's attribution of 
the supposedly propagandistic impulse at work behind the 
Whitechapel exhibitions to the influence of Ruskin's "theories of 
moralized aesthetics" is highly questionable. Much of Ruskin's 
later work can be seen as a sustained protest against the 
instrumentalization of art: the Barnetts would have got their 
Ruskin very wrong if they had thought his theory sanctioned a 
moralistic appropriation of art, no matter how laudable the 
intended purpose.
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Borzello's characterization of the Whitechapel exhibitions relies 
on an opposition between the moralistic "ideology" of family values 
which she attributes to the Barnetts and a disinterested, truly 
"aesthetic" mode of interest in art, by which standard she finds 
the Whitechapel exhibitions wanting. In contrast, I want to suggest 
that the thinking which lay behind the exhibitions was 
"ideological" because it enlisted a belief in the disinterested 
nature of "aesthetic" experience in the service of a project of 
social reform. What makes the Barnetts', and Ruskin's, writing 
about art "ideological" in nature is their assumptions about the 
nature of artistic form, rather than any particular descriptions of 
content.  
 
A certain ideology of "activity" and work is inherent in the 
Ruskinian account of what looking at a picture involves, and that 
this is what leads the Barnetts to propose the experience of art as 
a remedy against the enforced idleness of "pauperism". The "mental 
work", or active involvement of the mind in the process of 
perception, which a painting both requires from its viewers and of 
which, on the part of the artist, it is an expression, trains the 
mind in those habits of self-discipline which are essential to any 
kind of work. In this Ruskinian view, the emphasis on "work" does 
not contradict the characterization of the "aesthetic" as 
disinterested contemplation, because work itself is conceived as 
fundamentally disinterested in character (Ruskin stressed that true 
work was not essentially motivated by material reward, and this 
formed part of his quarrel with Whistler, whom he did regard as 
motivated by monetary gain).
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For Ruskinians such as the Barnetts, the morally important feature 
of work is its "form", as an exercise in self-denial. Regarding 
work in terms of its "content" of material reward leads to the 
mental condition characteristic of "pauperism", an immersion in 
immediate sensuous gratification whose corollary is a work-shy 
attitude. This position implies that what is character-building 
about the experience of art is not actual pictorial content but the 
process of viewing and interpreting a picture.
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This emphasis on work, and its relationship to the formal process 
of pictorial interpretation, can be seen in one of the catalogue 
entries quoted by Borzello in support of her argument about the 
essentially propagandistic impulse behind the Whitechapel 
exhibitions: 
 
What the Barnetts did with art was to use it as a vehicle for the preaching of 
Christian values. It is in the catalogue comments - the official captions to the 
pictures, as it were - that one sees most clearly what the Barnetts believed and what 
they believed paintings could do. In these comments, where teaching and preaching are 
woven together, the Barnetts' attitudes and values appear in innocent nakedness. 
Although some explanations were aimed at sowing the seeds of art appreciation, what 
the Barnetts really hoped to do with their comments was impart not an aesthetic 
education but a moral one, their vision of the perfect Christian world...In 1887, a 
seventeenth-century Flemish painting inspired the explanation: "At the mid-day meal, 
at the moment of saying grace. It is evidently a family where everyone lived, dressed, 
and prayed by rule and with obedience. Such was the secret of the patient industry 
which enabled the Dutch to protect their own country from the sea, and to conquer 
lands beyond the sea elsewhere." This uncompromising expression of religion and family 
as the secret of a successful society, when considered in the light of the Barnetts' 
experience of the imperfect family life of Whitechapel, shows the way they used 
pictures to propagate their personal Utopia.
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If we read the catalogue entry closely, the characteristics to 
which it draws attention are the distinctly non-pictorial ones of 
"rule", "obedience" and, by an even further extrapolation beyond 
the scene depicted, "patient industry". The viewer is being 
challenged to convert visible features of the painting into 
abstract qualities through a labour of interpretation which mirrors 
the "patient industry" the catalogue attributes to the Dutch.
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The catalogue entry is self-referential, in that it is describing 
the moral effects of the labour to which it is assuming this 
description will stimulate the viewer. Instead of presenting the 
pictures as moral examples to be passively imitated by the poor, 
the catalogue's effect can be seen as encouraging viewers to engage 
in an active appropriation of the picture through interpretation.  
 
As we shall see, for the Barnetts, as for Ruskin, it is the formal 
process of interpretation, not the content of the interpretation, 
that constitutes the moral education a picture has to offer. From 
this point of view the "moralizing" tendency of the entry 
represents an attempt to engage with an audience, rather than to 
talk down to them. The catalogue's "narrative" is provided to 
encourage viewers to look at the painting; the Barnetts are not 
exhibiting the picture simply for the sake of the narrative that is 
attached to it in the catalogue.   
 
iii) Landscape art and the language of painting 
 
A feature of the Barnetts' exhibiting policy which testifies to the 
emphasis on form rather than content in their aesthetic thought is 
the trouble they took to exhibit landscape. Frances Borzello cites 
Henrietta Barnett's comment, in her article "Pictures for the 
People", that special pains were taken to introduce the poor to 
landscape art  (although it was narrative art that was the most 
popular). Borzello assimilates this emphasis on landscape, however, 
to her overall view of the Barnetts as being engaged in an 
instrumentalization of art for their "improving" purposes.
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Borzello's characterization of the Whitechapel exhibitions as 
propagandistic leads her to emphasize pictorial content, as is 
evident in her comment on the catalogue entry to A W Bayes' 
Entrance to the Clothes Exchange (Houndsditch): 
 
A familiar bit of our own East London. Our friends will hardly recognize the bright 
colors in which the artist has painted the dingy Clothes Exchange. Yet the picture 
will serve to remind us that only a desire for beauty is needed to give Houndsditch 
something of the picturesqueness of Venice.
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Borzello remarks that "the comments also show that any glamorous 
depiction of London in paint was expected to meet with some 
resistance on the part of the spectators". But implicit in the 
entry is an emphasis on an aesthetic transformation of everyday 
life. Beauty, it is suggested, is not something inherent in a 
particular class of objects, but is the result of an act of will: 
the "desire for beauty" will make even Houndsditch beautiful. It is 
this theory of aesthetic experience as consisting in a process of 
active transfiguration of the world of perception which underlies 
the attitude towards the social function of art which led the 
Barnetts to mount the Whitechapel Exhibitions. 
 
The Barnetts' own preference for landscape over narrative art 
implies this aesthetic transformation of the visible world, since 
the significance of a landscape, unlike that of a narrative 
painting, must result from what the painting itself manages to 
convey about the scene, rather than from any external source of 
information. G F Watts, whose paintings were exhibited regularly at 
the Whitechapel exhibitions, describes this transformative power of 
landscape painting, in a passage which could be seen as summing up 
the Barnetts' programme of educational outreach: 
 
Art...[is] more than ever valuable, and even necessary, in an age, like the present, 
of social surroundings devoid of outward beauty and nobility, where the workers have 
little leisure, and in a country where the uncertain climate precludes the general 
habits of outdoor recreation...Its..value in an overworked age [is] as a graceful 
source of recreation, and as an educational factor. Eyes and mind little inclined to 
observe and receive pleasure and improvement from natural objects will often be 
stimulated by art to find pleasure in discovering for themselves the objects in nature 
that interested them in pictures. Natural objects presented to eyes that have been 
delighted by a beautiful representation of them will henceforth be very different from 
what they were before the representation gave them peculiar interest. The artist has 
been to these an interpreter of nature. He has revealed something more than had been 
previously perceived, and an awakened interest and delight takes the place of the old 
indifference.
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Watts' account of the social value of art invokes a notion of 
"defamiliarization": a painting's representation of the natural 
world requires the spectator to pay attention to the manner in 
which the natural world has been perceived by the artist, as shown 
by the way this perception is expressed on canvas, and it is this 
attention to the process of perception that transforms the 
spectator's subsequent, first-hand perceptions of nature. Watts' 
description of the educative effect of painting is focused on 
"form", or the inherent structure of the act of looking at a 
painting. 
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Watts' characterization of the value of art as consisting in 
"recreation" echoes the Barnetts own vocabulary, since the 
Barnetts' work in putting on the Whitechapel Exhibitions forms part 
of a wider interest in encouraging the poor to make a more 
effective use of their leisure time. For the Barnetts, part of the 
function of leisure time should be that defamiliarization of 
perception which Watts describes as inherent in the experience of 
art.
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Samuel Barnett set out his own view of the moral and social value 
of art in an uncompromising defence of his decision to open the 
exhibitions on Sundays: 
 
Well would it be if pictures were recognised as preachers, as voices of God, passing 
His lessons from age to age. The nation would not then dare to silence those voices on 
Sunday, and private owners would recognise the right of their brothers to the teaching 
of their common Father.
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It may seem hard to reconcile the apparently excessive religious 
rhetoric employed by Barnett with the essentially formalist 
aesthetic of defamiliarization to which I argue he and his wife, 
together with Watts, subscribe. I would suggest, however, that 
Barnett intends his description of pictures as "voices of God" 
quite literally, and that this attribution of transcendent moral 
value to pictures is entirely compatible with the formalist 
aesthetic of defamiliarization which underlies their view of the 
educative value of art. 
 
The key to this apparent paradox lies in the fact that the moral 
value Barnett attributes to paintings is, precisely, transcendent: 
Barnett does not go into details about what exactly the "voices of 
God" will be saying. The morality which he claims is inherent in 
painting is a morality without specific content, a morality which 
will be different for each individual. Given this purely "formal" 
definition, it is not hard to see how it would be compatible with a 
formalist aesthetic. Barnett shows his sympathy with advanced 
trends in theological and ethical thought in a late essay on "The 
Religion of the People" in which he advances a relativist argument 
about "forms of religion" not so far removed intellectually from 
the religious syncretism of G F Watts and his second wife, and from 
this point of view his claims for the inherent morality of art are 
not very different from Baudelairian aestheticism.
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Barnett's theological views do not explain, however, why he 
attaches this transcendent moral value specifically to paintings.  
Here that the Ruskinian basis of the Barnetts' notions about art 
becomes important. Far from being "moralistic" in the way Borzello 
claims, Ruskin's thinking about art implies the formalist aesthetic 
of defamiliarization which we have identified in the Barnetts and 
Watts. Ruskin's "moralism" is intimately related to a "formalist" 
perspective, in that both are a consequence of the epistemological 
individualism on which his position is based. Given his fundamental 
assumption that all perception consists in a process of 
interpretation which is affected by an individual's moral 
condition, it is, as Ruskin is well aware, a consequence of his 
position that only the formal aspect of his interpretations of art 
can be generalized to individuals other than himself. Ruskin may 
offer specific interpretations but, like the Whitechapel exhibition 
catalogue entries, they should be regarded as the stimulus to a 
perceptual and interpretative labour which can only be undertaken 
by individuals for themselves.
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Barnett's characterization of pictures as God's "voices" implies a 
linguistic model of how paintings communicate meaning which is also 
apparent in Watts' frequent references to painting as a "language". 
Far from indicating a fundamentally narrative approach to art, 
however, these references to the "language" of painting reflect an 
epistemology in which painting, and visual perception itself, is 
conceived as fundamentally non-representational in character, in 
that there is no relation of natural "resemblance" between the 
forms of painting and the natural world they signify. This emphasis 
on the non-representational nature of painting reflects not just 
the influence of Ruskin, but the indebtedness of Barnett, Watts and 
Ruskin himself to a model of perception whose most coherent 
formulation was set out by the Common Sense philosophers in their 
late eighteenth century controversy with David Hume.
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The epistemology proposed by Thomas Reid, and other members of the 
Common Sense school of philosophy, postulates that all sense 
perception is fundamentally communal in nature, not the solitary 
experience assumed by Locke and Hume. In many ways, the Common 
Sense philosophical position can be understood as an elaboration of 
Berkeley's Essay on Vision, which suggests that we should regard 
sight as a kind of interpretation of the signs which God has placed 
in the world, rather than an apprehension of immediately 
intelligible sense-data.
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One of the key analogies of both Berkeley and Reid is with 
painterly techniques whereby gradation of colour, for example, is 
used to suggest qualities of space, such as distance, which cannot 
be directly represented. Sight, according to Berkeley, is a kind of 
reading of the divine handwriting which God has left in the world, 
and the achievement of painters, Reid suggests, consists in 
learning to direct their attention to this "handwriting", the 
visible signs themselves, rather than to its content, the 
perceptual knowledge which these signs convey. The techniques of 
painting are a human imitation of God's handwriting, in a way which 
reveals that there is no natural relationship of resemblance 
between what physically impacts on our senses and what we 
understand through sense perception. For Reid and the other Common 
Sense philosophers, perception is fundamentally non-
representational in character: perceiving is a process essentially 
akin to interpreting a language, although our habituation to this 
process means that we have a natural tendency to think of our 
perceptions as immediately intelligible.
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Reid's argument that habit blinds us to the true nature of sense-
perception as a process of interpretation helps to explain the 
important role I have suggested "defamiliarization" plays in the 
Ruskinian aesthetics of Barnett and Watts. Viewing paintings, for 
these Ruskinians, has the potential to be a revelation of the 
divine not because it is fundamentally different from other forms 
of sense perception, but because it testifies to sense perception's 
true nature. The very techniques which the painter uses to render 
the experience of vision make obvious the fundamentally active, 
interpretative role of the mind in the process of perception.  
 
In this Ruskinian view, paintings, if studied closely, belie the 
assumption we naturally fall into, that sense perceptions are 
immediately intelligible: they thus have the potential to redirect 
our attention away from self towards God, whose divine language of 
signs our minds interpret in the process of perception. Through 
this shift of mental attitude, perception, instead of being a self-
directed activity, becomes an other-directed activity, and so 
capable of morally educating the individual.
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This view of perception as the reading of signs, which is 
characteristic of Common Sense philosophy, can been seen to 
underlie Ruskin's aesthetic position right from the opening of 
Modern Painters, particularly in the distinction he makes between 
"truth " and "imitation":  
 
Painting, or art generally, as such, with all its technicalities, difficulties, and 
particular ends, is nothing but a noble and expressive language... 
 The word Truth, as applied to art, signifies the faithful statement, either to 
the mind or senses, of any fact of nature... 
 Truth may be stated by any signs or symbols which have a definite signification 
in the minds of those to whom they are addressed, although such signs be themselves no 
image nor likeness of anything. Whatever can excite in the mind the conception of 
certain facts, can give ideas of truth, though it be in no degree the imitation or 
resemblance of those facts. If there be - we do not say there is, - but if there be in 
painting anything which operates, as words do, not by resembling anything, but by 
being taken as a symbol and substitute for it, and thus inducing the effect of it, 
then this channel of communication can convey uncorrupted truth, though it do not in 
any degree resemble the facts whose conception it induces.
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What indicates Ruskin's heritage from Common Sense philosophy here 
is the concern to distance painting from any necessary relation of 
"resemblance" to the physical world. Pictures, for Ruskin, can and 
should convey "thought" because the ability of painting to portray 
things is not materially determined.  
 
Ruskin's insistence on "truth" in painting, which is defined in 
entirely non-representational terms, is coupled with a hostility 
towards "imitation", which is dismissed as a lower form of 
achievement. Ruskin consistently describes painting as a form, not 
of immediately intelligible representation, but of language: that 
is to say, a way of suggesting notions to the mind which does not 
rely on materially embodying or portraying them. However, for 
Ruskin the language of painting is not arbitrary or conventional, 
since its foundation is the divine language of visual signs which 
God himself has instituted in the world. 
 
To describe the Ruskinian position as a moralized aesthetics is 
misleading because it implies that moral significance has been 
"bolted on" to a category of "the aesthetic" which is in itself 
independent of such considerations. Morality, however, of a non-
specific and "formal" kind, is integral to Ruskin's definition of 
the experience of art as a spiritual emancipation from materiality. 
However unsympathetic we may be to Ruskin's account of art, it is 
difficult to deny that he is describing an experience which may 
legitimately be called "aesthetic", because his account rests on a 
theory of perception which is just as philosophically valid as the 
more familiar one associated with David Hume.
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Even where Ruskinian discussion of pictures appears at its most 
sentimental, the "morality" it adumbrates is the purely "formal" 
one of a spiritual escape from materiality, and so should be 
distinguished from mere sermonizing (unless, that is, we are 
prepared to dismiss Symbolism, Expressionism and many other 
modernist artistic movements as examples of "sermonizing"). For 
example, Ruskin's claim, in Book Two of Modern Painters, that the 
expression of "infinity" is necessary to all painting, is not a 
"moral" he foists on to the pictures he discusses, but an integral 
part of his view of what painting is, and even in the often caustic 
notes Ruskin later added to Book Two he does not repudiate this 
basic point.
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A similar point can be made about the Whitechapel exhibition 
catalogue entries. Borzello quotes a comment by Henrietta Barnett, 
about over-hearing two working-class girls discussing "Mr Schmalz's 
picture of "Forever"", in which she suggests that "the idea of love 
lasting beyond this life, making eternity real, a spiritual bond 
between man and woman, had not occurred to them until the picture 
with the simple story was shown them". Borzello characterizes this 
as an example of how the Barnetts used art "as a vehicle for the 
preaching of Christian values", but there is really nothing 
specifically Christian about Henrietta Barnett's interpretation: 
one might just as easily call it Shelleyan. The really important 
point for Henrietta Barnett is that the picture has suggested to 
the girls a way of transcending the circumstances which surround 
them, and it is this is fundamental to the connection the Barnetts 
make between their work in promoting pictures to the poor and their 
involvement in Poor Law administration and reform.
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iv) Ruskinian aesthetics and Poor Law administration 
 
The influence of Common Sense philosophy can also be seen in the 
Barnetts' thought about social questions, and particularly in their 
attitude to the administration of the Poor Law. The epistemological 
individualism of this philosophy, which insists that the 
intelligibility of the world can only result from an individual 
effort of interpretation, also applies in the moral sphere, 
suggesting that social harmony must be earned through the labour of 
individuals. This leads the Barnetts to criticize the institutions 
for poor relief of their day, on the grounds that they corrupt the 
poor morally and so lead directly to social disunity. Doling out 
unearned money, in their view, does the poor no favours, it simply 
reinforces the moral laziness characteristic of "pauperism".
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Put like this, the Barnetts' views sound like the worst variety of 
"on yer bike" Thatcherism. Their individualism, however, is more 
sophisticated and morally relative than this, in that it prompts a 
critique of the attitudes of the rich, as well as those of the 
poor. In the Barnetts' view, the claim that social good must be 
earned through labour applies just as much to the rich as it does 
to the poor. Doling out money is an insufficient response to the 
problem of poverty, because it absolves the rich from their social 
duty to engage personally with the condition of the poor. Charity, 
if confined to the giving of money, corrupts the rich as surely as 
it corrupts the poor: indeed for the Barnetts the moral conditions 
of rich and poor mirror each other. Given these attitudes, it is 
not surprising to find Canon Barnett, towards the end of his life, 
involved with early Welfare State thinking, in the form of the 
universal state provision of pensions.
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In the Barnetts' writings on poverty and Poor Law administration 
there is a rejection of notions of spontaneous "benevolence" in 
favour of an appeal to a counterintuitive conception of "duty", 
whose insusceptibility to a utilitarian rational analysis is 
emphasized. One of the Barnetts' main objects of attack was the 
spontaneous giving of individuals, which they saw as merely 
prolonging the condition of poverty. Henrietta Barnett, in her 
memoir of Samuel Barnett, sums up his attitude to such doles: 
 
 To remedy such evils, a few people were giving thought and time, and many 
people were giving doles, doles which insulted the receiver as well as condemned the 
giver, whose charity cost him nothing, not even the self-control of a passing 
emotion... 
 Added to the indiscriminate giving of individuals was the injurious and 
corrupting relief provided by the Poor Law authorities and charitable societies, 
offered with little consideration for the effect on the character, or the future of 
the recipient... 
 The whole system, if it could be called a "system", was wasteful and 
ineffective, but its worst result was its evil influence on the poor, who were taught 
to beg, to prevaricate and to lie about their circumstances.
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It is clear that the focus of the Barnetts' interest was on the 
relationship which poor relief established between givers and 
recipients, rather than on the material aid which was actually 
given. This interest in the form of poor relief, rather than its 
content, parallels their emphasis on the formal process of viewing 
pictures and is accompanied by a similar suspicion of sensuous 
immediacy.  
 
Simply giving a dole, as Henrietta Barnett notes, costs the wealthy 
nothing, "not even the self-control of a passing emotion". The 
reference to self-control is crucial, pointing to the impossibility 
of educating the poor to exercise the self-control which would 
improve their material well-being, when spontaneous giving by the 
rich testifies to a fundamental lack of any such self-control. The 
moral condition of the poor is simply a reflection of the self-
indulgent attitudes of the rich who patronize them. 
 
The Barnett's central criticism of dole-giving, then, is that it 
does not contribute to the development of "character" in either of 
the participants in the process, the donor or the recipient. As 
Samuel Barnett put it, "character is the one thing needful": the 
eradication of poverty requires an improvement in the moral 
character of the poor, in their capacities for resourcefulness and 
self-control, but this cannot be achieved without a corresponding 
improvement in the moral character of the rich. It is this 
development of character in both poor and rich that the process of 
poor relief must achieve if it is to be effective.
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The Barnetts' criticisms of the existing institutions of the Poor 
Law are fundamentally anti-utilitarian. Althought the purpose of 
poor relief is the material welfare of the poor, focussing 
exclusively on the material end at the expense of the process of 
moral development involved in it, as occurs in dole-giving, is 
simply self-defeating. In their view, the utilitarian concentration 
on material good ends up by defeating even its own limited aims.
34
  
 
The Barnetts regarded the benevolence of the rich as morally 
corrupting because of its fundamentally "sensuous" basis, as an 
immediate and unpremeditated response to the spectacle of poverty; 
as Henrietta Barnett commented, it testified to a lack of "self-
control". In this context, and within the terms of the Ruskinian 
aesthetic examined here, the Barnett's institution of the 
Whitechapel Exhibitions can be seen as an attempt at an alternative 
form of poor relief. To enable the poor to view paintings is to 
enable them to transcend that susceptibility to sensuous 
gratification which keeps them poor, rather than confirming them in 
their sensuousness as monetary donations tend to do.
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The Barnetts' belief that exposure to art would promote the poor's 
capacity for self-control can be paralleled in the writing of G F 
Watts. In an article on "The Present Conditions of Art", Watts 
suggests that "nothing is so likely to cure the wide spread of 
habits of intemperance that disgrace the nation as taste for art 
and music generally developed". As I have argued is the case for 
the Barnetts, Watts regards art as assisting the mind to develop 
the ability to transcend material circumstances, and hence as an 
experience which by its very nature will encourage the formation of 
virtuous habits.
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The connection between the Whitechapel Exhibitions and the 
Barnetts' ideas about poor relief is also shown by their more 
general interest in the provision of "recreational" facilities for 
the poor, an interest which they shared with Watts. Here too the 
issue of "sensuousness" is central. The Barnetts define 
"recreation" in a very particular way, as involving the active 
exercise of mental faculties. By this criterion, the standard 
amusements available to the poor, such as going to the music hall, 
are found wanting by the Barnetts, on the grounds that they are all 
characterized by the passive reception of "sensation".
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The Barnetts' argument is that the poor need to be educated into 
the ability to engage in "recreation", by exposure to the more 
mentally demanding forms of high art. This kind of education in 
"recreation" is necessary to enable the poor to benefit from nature 
itself. Merely conveying the poor into the countryside is not 
enough, since without educational preparation the visit will be 
merely one more passively absorbed "sensation": what the poor need 
is the ability to "read", or actively interpret the countryside. It 
is this kind of education that painting can provide.
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v) The politics of the Whitechapel exhibitions  
 
In this account of the interrelationship between the Barnetts' 
Ruskinian aesthetics, their attitudes towards poor relief and their 
advocacy of the value of recreation, the central role played in 
their thought by an appeal to mental "activity" has been 
emphasized. In conclusion, I would like to address the question of 
the political function the Barnetts envisaged for art. Although I 
have suggested that an interpretation of the Whitechapel 
exhibitions which characterizes them as simple propaganda for 
"Victorian values" is too reductive, I think it is still possible 
to identify an ideological project behind the exhibitions. 
 
That ideological project is the promotion of individualism among 
the poor. The Barnetts regard viewing pictures as an interpretive 
process which requires mental labour on the part of individuals; in 
this, it is unlike the amusements which are normally offered to the 
poor even by philanthropists, which require nothing more than the 
passive absorption of sensations. In a similar way, the Barnetts 
reject the model of charity as passive absorption by the poor of 
benevolent "doles" by the rich in favour of requiring the poor, 
where possible, actively to earn poor relief.
39
 
 
The individualism underlying the Barnetts' Ruskinian aesthetics is 
thus present both at an epistemological and at a social level. 
Truly educative kinds of art require a willed act of attention on 
the part of the individual as a precondition of their 
intelligibility: the viewer must move beyond the sensuous immediacy 
of the painting's surface in order to interpret the signs by which 
it represents the world. This requirement is paralleled at the 
level of social action: true charity to the poor consists in moving 
beyond the sensuous immediacy of spontaneous giving through an act 
of will in which social appearances are interrogated in order to 
arrive at the underlying moral principles of society. For the 
Barnetts, just as painting implies that both painter and viewer 
must learn to recognize their immediate sensations as signs of 
realities outside themselves, so too any attempt to engage in poor 
relief must involve both giver and recipient in questioning their 
immediate responses: without this interpretative labour on the part 
of individuals, poor relief must end up merely reproducing the 
existing social situation which is responsible for the phenomenon 
of "pauperism".
40
 
 
What happens in the interpretive process of viewing a picture is 
thus for the Barnetts essentially the same as what should be 
happening in social processes of poor relief. The converse of this 
is also true: the degeneration of poor relief into "sensationalism" 
which the Barnetts on many occasions deplored has its parallel in 
the danger of painting degenerating into mere "imitation" to which 
Ruskin points in Modern Painters. This degenerative threat, like 
the Barnetts' Ruskinian individualism, is at once an 
epistemological and a social condition. "Sensationalism" is a state 
in which, as in Humean epistemology, the immediacy of sensation is 
the sole reality; for the Barnetts this correlates with 
"pauperism", as a tendency to look no further than immediate 
gratification (though they would add that this also describes the 
condition of the rich).
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Within the Barnetts' Ruskinian vocabulary, "individualism" and 
"sensationalism" are opposites, a distinction which reflects the 
union of epistemological and social categories in their thinking. 
The immersion in sensuous immediacy implied by "sensationalism" 
reflects a social condition in which the individual is 
unreflectingly submerged in the crowd. This connection becomes 
particularly clear in S A Barnett's 1886 article "Sensationalism in 
Social Reform". Barnett takes issue with the Victorian equivalent 
of "sound-bite culture", which he sees as increasingly 
characteristic of the charitable associations of his day: 
 
Strong statements can hardly be fair statements, and loud statements can rarely be 
exhaustively accurate...Party spirit..inspires those who hold even grand beliefs and 
support great causes, the height and depth and breadth of which they have had neither 
the time nor will to measure; and the spirit degrades their character. It is not a 
gain to a man to be a Christian or a Liberal if by so doing he becomes certain that 
there is no right nor truth on the side of a Mohammedan or a Tory. He has not, that 
is, risen to the height of his character: rather, as Mr. Coleridge says, "He who 
begins by loving Christianity better than the truth will proceed by loving his own 
sect or church better than Christianity, and end in loving himself better than all.
42
 
 
Barnett here associates sensationalism with party spirit and, 
ultimately, with selfishness, in a way which is very revealing 
about the ideological project behind the Whitechapel exhibitions. 
Later on in the same article, Barnett suggests that the impatience 
and short-termism characteristic of charitable "sensationalism", 
instead of narrowing the class divide, in fact deepen it. An 
emphasis on immediately apparent change implies "the belief that 
things done for people are more effective than things done with 
them." But this is to neglect the development of character, with 
the result that the poor become as impatient and short-termist as 
the charitable organisations that are ostensibly serving them: 
 
All suffering and much sin are laid at the doors of the rich, and speakers are 
approved who say that if by any means property could be more equally shared, more 
happiness and virtue would follow. Schemes, therefore, which offer such means, are 
welcomed almost without inquiry...Scamps and idlers come forward with cries which get 
popular support, and the mass of the poor now cherish such a jealous disposition that, 
were they suddenly to inherit the place of the richer classes, they would inherit 
their vices also, and make a state of society in no way better than at present.
43
  
 
The corollary of charitable "sensationalism", the failure to move 
beyond immediate appearances, is a threatening political radicalism 
on the part of the poor. As in his analysis of dole-giving, Barnett 
sees the failure to develop "character", the capacity for self-
control and long-term thinking, as resulting in a breakdown of the 
relationship between rich and poor. Political radicalism, however, 
is for Barnett ineffective in just the same way as short-termist 
charity: it merely ends up reproducing the social structures whose 
effects it intends to alleviate. Once again in Barnett's view the 
conditions of poor and rich mirror each other, both being 
manifestations of a common "sensationalism". 
 
The connection the Barnetts make between "sensationalism" and the 
socially divisive forces of selfishness and party-spirit explains 
their hostility to popular forms of entertainment (essentially 
"sensationalist", in the Barnetts' view) and their insistence on 
promoting high culture to the poor. Ultimately, the Barnetts seem 
to have thought that the kind of exposure to high culture 
represented by the Whitechapel exhibitions would prevent the 
formation of specifically working-class forms of political 
organization, which they regarded as inherently socially divisive. 
Hostility to working-class political organization is clearly 
apparent in Samuel Barnett's attitudes to trade-unions, which he 
regards as organized forms of selfishness.
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The Barnetts' thinking is characteristically even-handed: 
"sensationalism" is regarded as leading both to political 
radicalism among the poor and, among the wealthier classes, to 
self-serving charitable associations whose only real aim is to 
promote their own organization. Nevertheless, the Barnetts regard 
the high culture of the Whitechapel exhibitions as intrinsically 
preferable to popular culture, in a way that makes clear the 
ideological and class-based nature of their Ruskinian aesthetics. 
What is ideological about the Whitechapel exhibitions is not 
fundamentally the content of individual pictures or their catalogue 
descriptions, but the Barnetts' founding assumption that the 
viewing of pictures is intrinsically linked to values, at once 
social and aesthetic, of "disinterestedness".
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For the Barnetts, art, and high culture generally, promote 
disinterestedness because they create the possibility of freedom 
from the determining influence of the environment in a way that 
popular forms of entertainment cannot. The passive absorption of 
sensation which they find characteristic of popular culture 
subsumes the individual in their environment. The interpretative 
labour required by art, on the other hand, develops the 
individual's capacity to detach themselves from the immediate 
influence of their environment, and so ultimately tends to make the 
individual into a citizen capable of disinterested political 
action. 
 The Barnetts arrive at this conclusion about the social function of 
art on the basis of epistemological considerations about the forms 
of experience available to the poor. They constantly stress in 
their writing on recreation the narrowness of the range of 
experience usually available to the poor, and consistently suggest 
that the narrowness of their experience accounts for the poor's 
selfish tendency to merely sensuous forms of self-gratification 
(among which they class popular forms of entertainment).
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It is important to stress that the Barnetts do not regard the poor 
as intrinsically selfish: they link the poor's sensuality with 
their selfishness on epistemological grounds, because in their view 
self-centredness is inherent in a merely sensuous mode of 
apprehending the world. David Hume's account of the effect of the 
association of ideas in reconciling us to our surroundings helps to 
explain the connection the Barnetts make between the poor's 
experiential narrowness and their tendency toward selfishness. It 
is appropriate to employ Hume's sensationalist epistemology because 
from the Barnetts' Ruskinian point of view it describes (and is 
symptomatic of) a certain condition of mind, though it would not be 
seen as applicable to all forms of experience.
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No matter how inherently unpleasant our surroundings are, Hume 
suggests, we gradually come to take pleasure in them because they 
become associated with the idea of self (which for Hume is always 
pleasing). From the Barnetts' viewpoint, one can see that the 
narrowness of the poor's experience merely accelerates this natural 
tendency. The poor tend to be selfish and sensual because they 
experience so little that is not immediately connected with the 
self.
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Art, then, for the Barnetts, can fulfil an important social 
function through its ability to convey ideas which are not 
immediately connected with the self. As Samuel Barnett comments: 
 
The admiration of beautiful things will not, we know, keep men from being selfish and 
sensual, but neither is there any other nostrum which by itself will cure evil. Until 
people are conscious of all that is within them they have not fulness of life, or in 
other words, eternal life...Ideas have not reached the minds of the masses through 
books; pictures, if they could be more generally shown in churches and in public 
buildings, on Sundays and week-days, would educate people so that they might realise 
the extent and meaning of the past, the beauty of nature, and the substance of hope.
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Beauty is not by itself a remedy for mental acquiescence in passive 
sensuousness, since the mind can only rouse itself from this 
condition through its own efforts. What pictures can do, according 
to Barnett, is furnish "the minds of the masses" with "ideas" which 
will help them in their moral struggle against the tendency to 
selfishness. 
 
Barnett's remark echoes Ruskin's claim that the measure of great 
art is the number of ideas it manages to express.  Both Barnett and 
Ruskin seem to be using the word "idea" in a quasi-Platonic or 
Coleridgean sense, for a conception that transcends the material 
world, and it is this non-material sense which underpins Barnett's 
suggestion that ideas are a remedy against selfishness. 
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In Barnett's terms, the non-material "ideas" which paintings are 
able to convey, assist the poor in moving from the "passive" 
psychological and epistemological regime described by Hume to the 
"active" one to which Ruskin and the Common Sense philosophers 
appeal, because they counteract the influence of association over 
the mind. The non-material nature of the "ideas" which art 
expresses prevents their being combined through association with 
the otherwise wholly material ideas with which the poor are usually 
presented, and so provide a counterweight to the exclusive self-
interest which is naturally inherent in the only ideas with which 
the poor are normally conversant. 
 
"Association", of course, is a word which has both epistemological 
and social meanings. To suggest, as Barnett does, that the "ideas" 
which art conveys cannot be assimilated into the "associations" of 
the poor is also to suggest that these "ideas" will prevent the 
development of specifically working-class forms of political 
organization. The politics of the Barnetts' Whitechapel exhibitions 
can thus be seen to be fundamentally akin to Arnold's prescription 
of culture as a remedy for social anarchy. The ideas conveyed by 
art will assist in the development of a "best self", a source of 
authority internal to the individual but located in a sphere beyond 
the immediacies of practical politics.
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